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Abstract 
We evaluate public-private sector wage differentials in Turkey for the years 2005 and 2011, a period 
marked by educational upgrading and restructuring in public employment. Using micro data from 
Household Labour Force Surveys we find a positive premium for low wage earners and a penalty of 
working in the public sector at the higher end of the distribution. Although the penalty has not 
disappeared, the price effect has increased, especially at the right end of the distribution owing to a 
relatively uneven wage increase in the private sector along the distribution, rather than an explicit 
public wage policy. 
Keywords: public employment, wage differentials, decomposition, quantile regression. 
JEL Classification: J31, J45, C31. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Turkey’s economy has undergone a major restructuring under the Justice and Development Party’s 
successive single party governments following the 2001 crisis. After a decade of macroeconomic 
instability in the 1990s, public finance management has substantially improved. The governments 
have pursued and consolidated the central examinations for public sector recruitment that had started 
in 1999. Initially affecting low-skill employees, these examinations have gradually been expanded to 
comprise employees of all skill levels. In accordance with tight fiscal policies, and in continuity with 
the rationalization process, public employment policy aimed at enhancing productivity by recruiting 
better qualified employees and decreasing the share of public employment in total employment. 
Consequently, the level of education has increased much more than in the private sector and the share 
of public employment has decreased. 
These transformations have contributed to the improvement of “government effectiveness”– a measure 
of the quality of public services - which has steadily increased from 0.16 to 0.36 from 2005 to 2011 
(World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators - WGIs). Figure 1 shows the evolution of 
government effectiveness in comparison with the evolution of other indicators’ average: late 1990s – 
early 2000s are marked by economic and political instability, single party governments take office in 
2002 and 2005 onwards government effectiveness outperforms other governance indicators such as 
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism and rule of law that have 
either stagnated or deteriorated. 
 
Figure 1 
 
This paper seeks at analyzing the public-private wage differential and its evolution in the context of 
public sector restructuring in terms of employment, tight fiscal policy and higher quality of public 
services. Using Household Labour Force Surveys (HLFSs), we specifically aim at answering the 
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following questions: Is there a public sector wage premium? What are the contributions of the 
composition and price effects at the mean and across the wage distribution?1 How has the public wage 
premium evolved from 2005 to 2011, and why? Alongside the public-private wage gap analysis, we 
decompose real hourly wage increase within the public and private sector separately in order to 
compare the respective price effects and see whether the evolution observed in the premia has been the 
outcome of a greater price effect in either one of the sectors, i.e., whether upgrading in public 
employment has been accompanied by an explicit public wage policy or has indirectly benefitted from 
private sector wage dynamics.  
We use both the Oaxaca-Blinder (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) decomposition technique for 
measuring the gap at the mean, and Melly (2005)’s decomposition using quantile regressions. We also 
compare the quantile decomposition (Melly, 2005) results with the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce (1993) (JMP) 
decomposition. In the next section we first discuss the factors that affect the public-private wage gap, 
and provide a summary of studies conducted in the case of Turkey. In a third section we present 
methodology and data; we discuss results in section four and finally provide concluding remarks.  
 
2. WHY THE GAP?  
The main question in the public-private wage gap literature has been to disentangle whether there is a 
premium in working in the public sector or not. Theoretically, although the premium can be found in 
either sector, overall the outcome depends on the specific context and necessitates empirical 
investigation. Notwithstanding vast differences in terms of magnitude and outlier cases, the evidence 
suggests that conditional upon individual, household and job-related characteristics, in a majority of 
cases the public wage premium is positive at the mean, higher for lower wages or lower qualifications, 
                                                           
1
 The vocabulary used for both effects vary. The composition or endowment effect is also called observed 
(observable) characteristic, and is captured by control variables. The price effect captures the rest, also called the 
unobserved (unobservable) characteristic, i.e., it is the component of the total or raw or unconditional wage gap 
that cannot be explained by the control variables, also called the adjusted or conditional pay gap, or the wage 
premium. The total, or raw or unadjusted, gap refers to the sum of both effects. Note that some studies use the 
term premium equivalently to the total, unadjusted, gap (Borjas, 2002).  
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and greater for women.2 Basically the nature of the gap depends on a large number of non-monetary 
institutional factors affecting individual preferences, which need to be considered in relation with 
demand and supply dynamics in either sector.  
Although our study does not empirically account for these institutional factors, it is useful to 
summarize the expected effects in order to discuss the results. These institutions entail: wage-setting 
procedures (indexation systems, minimum wage), the level of centralization of the public sector, 
unionization and negotiation power, employment protection legislation, size of the informal sector, 
working hours, and public sector allowances and side benefits. 
Public premium is expected to be higher in countries having a centralized collective wage bargaining 
system in the public sector. Greater (lesser) unionization implies higher (lower) wages, notably 
workers with lower qualifications at the lower end of the distribution are most likely to be affected by 
collective bargaining outcomes and minimum wage setting where they exists. Moreover, in the public 
sector “it is often assumed that most workers will receive collectively bargained rates of pay, even if 
they are not themselves union members, practices that extend collectively bargained rates either as a 
matter of public policy, or because the practice is regarded as commensurate with the public sector's 
role as a ‘good employer’ and a ‘fair employer’” (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2010). As a result, wage 
compression is generally higher in the public sector, and in most instances there is a penalty of 
working in the public sector for high wage earners (skilled workers) as opposed to a premium for low 
wage earners (unskilled workers).  
In terms of employment protection if job security and tenure (and possibly returns to tenure/seniority) 
are higher in the public sector, it may be a selection criterion for risk-averse individuals, or low wage-
earners having less marketable skills. Additionally, lower working hours in the public sector may 
increase premium, not only for individuals having a preference for shorter working hours (for women 
labour sharing is important within the household), but also for a larger share of the population if actual 
                                                           
2
 Among recent comparative empirical studies Christofides and Michael (2013), Depalo et al. (2013), and de 
Castro et al. (2013) estimate and analyze the gap for respectively 27, 10 and 26 EU countries, Mizala et al. 
(2011) for Latin American countries, and Lausev (2013) provides a literature survey comparing eastern 
European countries with developed economies. Countries with a stable or increasing premium constitute a 
minority. 
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working hours are higher than stipulated by the legislation and are under or uncompensated, as widely 
observed in developing economies’ private sector. The existence of a large informal sector, similarly 
to long uncompensated working hours, may increase the supply elasticity of hourly wage in the formal 
private sector (thereby the public wage premium), especially for low-skilled workers who also account 
for a large share of informal employment. Finally, where allowances and side benefits (e.g. housing, 
transport, food, childcare, maternal leave practices, etc.) are higher in the public sector, the premium is 
likely to be lower.3 
In addition to institutional factors, labour demand conditions that prevail in either sector are also 
important such that lower labour demand in the private sector is likely to increase the wage premium, 
in other words, the lesser the slack in the private sector the lower the public wage premium. In turn, 
such effects may vary according to skill level and along the wage distribution. On the other hand, 
labour demand in the public sector depends on a large number of factors of which fiscal pressure: in 
countries where the public sector is a large employer, the price effect is likely to be higher. In such 
cases the decrease of the role of the public sector implies a greater role for the private sector, and a 
transition to a more competitive wage policy where the premium for working in the public sector is 
expected to decrease, which has typically been the case of eastern European countries (Lausev, 2013), 
or the Troika countries that are currently undergoing tight fiscal policies and severe budget cuts 
reflected as public wage cuts (Christofides and Michael, 2013). As such a high public wage premium 
may be problematic in a country suffering from large public indebtedness and a high share of public 
employment; however this may not be the case for a country experiencing lesser fiscal pressure and a 
not too high public employment, i.e. lesser pressure on the wage bill. 
In terms of gender-differentiated factors, the greater the magnitude of gender discrimination in the 
private sector the greater the difference of the premium between men and women. Again this may vary 
along the distribution: for instance, if the unexplained component for women is higher than that for 
                                                           
3
 In most developing countries, childcare supply is greater in the public sector, either because it is not a 
compulsory in the private sector or not respected. Similarly, maternal leave, even when legislation exists, is 
rarely fully applied in the private sector. 
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men for high wage earners then there is evidence for a glass ceiling effect affecting women (for an 
early contribution see Albrecht et al., 2003).  
Public-private wage gap in Turkey 
Although the literature on the public-private wage gap is vast, it remains quite scarce in Turkey due to 
the fact that the data set used for labour market analysis, the HLFS, does not explicitly account for 
public employment: the questionnaires only ask whether the individual works in the private sector. 
Upon request the Turkish Statistical Institute has provided the valuable information that the default to 
the question is being employed in the public sector. Hence, this is the first study examining the issue 
using HLFSs and adopting a definition of the public sector without having to deduce the information 
from sectoral activity. 
The three studies that address the issue use budget surveys where the sector of employment (public - 
private) is directly asked for. Tansel (2005) uses the 1994 Household Expenditure Survey, 
Akhmedjonov and Izgi (2012) use the 2009 Household Budget Survey (HBS) and San and Polat 
(2012) use the 1994 Household Income Distribution and Consumption Expenditure Survey4 and the 
2008 Household Budget Survey. These studies bear a number of shortcomings that can be summarized 
as follows. First, the number of covariates and sample size are limited in the budget surveys. Second, 
the time period is limited to one year except in San and Polat (2012) who consider two years. Third, 
the definition of the dependent variable is problematic. Except Tansel who considers real hourly 
wages, there is no explicit definition in San and Polat (2012), and Akhmedjonov and Izgi (2012) use 
annual wages. Fourth, informality is a salient feature of Turkey’s labour market, and in order to 
minimize bias, the public-private differential can be at best estimated by considering the formal private 
sector, which is only done by Tansel (2005). San and Polat (2012) include informal employees as a 
control dummy, and Akhmedjonov and Izgi (2012) do not raise the issue. Fifth, all studies consider 
                                                           
4
 Both Tansel (2005) and San and Polat (2012) refer to the same dataset (1994) fully named as: “Household 
Income and Consumption Expenditure Survey” (HICES). The survey has not been conducted between 1995 and 
2001, and called the “Household Budget Survey” (HBS) 2002 onwards.  
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population from the age 15 onwards which is problematic in that it increases the risk of self-selection 
bias especially if entering the public sector requires higher level diplomas.  
Tansel (2005) divides the public sector into two subsamples: public administration and state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and finds different premia. Unfortunately, the HLFSs do not contain such a 
distinction, nevertheless, our data contains detailed occupation and economic activity classification 
which controls for sectoral characteristics; more, employment in SOEs are much lower in the second 
half of the 2000s compared with 1994, following privatization policies. Also, the labour force surveys 
include NUTS2 regional breakdown (26 regions), this variable is instrumental in capturing the vast 
differences that exist in terms of living costs which may affect inter-regional wage differentials in the 
private sector; and regional compensations that are included in public wages. Only Tansel (2005) 
controls for regions, but the breakdown is limited to seven in the 1994 survey. San and Polat (2012) 
use the quantile decomposition, however their mean values are not very consistent with the values they 
find along the distribution, more the findings suggest that both the composition and price effects are 
declining along the distribution unlike what the literature suggests. The other two studies only 
consider decomposition at the mean.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
A difficult issue in public-private wage gap studies is the self-selection bias (or endogenous sector 
selection). A large number of techniques have been suggested in the literature for selectivity 
correction. The mostly widely used techniques are instrumental variables (IV) regressions and 
propensity score matching (PSM).5 The only relevant type of instrumental variable is the one that can 
                                                           
5
 Another option would be using panel data –a feature that is absent from Turkey’s HLFSs-  and estimate fixed 
effects quantile regressions, which can still be a problem “unlike in linear models where the unobserved 
individual fixed effects can be differenced out and are thus omitted from the estimation, the individual fixed 
effects in a fixed effects quantile regression model have to be estimated along with the coefficients. As a result, it 
is very difficult to implement when the number of parameters involved here is so large. Further, only when the 
endogeneity of sector choice results from time-invariant individual heterogeneity, can a fixed effects model 
(either linear or quantile regression) solve the endogeneity issue. When sector choice depends on time-variant 
unobservables, fixed effects models are not helpful, and instrumental variables are required to deal with the 
endogeneity.” (Cai and Liu, 2011, p. 371-372). 
8 
 
account for the bias, i.e., a variable that gives information concerning the individual before sector 
selection (ex-ante), unfortunately in most data sets appropriate variables are hard to find and variables 
that give actually information after sector selection (ex-post) are used: “To correct for endogenous 
sector choice, identification requires exclusion restrictions. In many studies, the data is not rich 
enough to provide appropriate instruments and identification assumptions are sometimes doubtful” 
(Melly, 2006). As such, Melly, among others, uses variables such as father’s employment 
characteristics or mother’s labour force status. Such information, or any ex-ante information relevant 
in assessing the bias is unavailable in our dataset, and we chose not to use ex-post variables. More, 
even the ex-ante instruments (or “background variables” after Melly) may not be appropriate as they 
may be correlated with “intergenerationally transmitted (unobservable) skills” (Siminski, 2013, p. 
1916). Birch (2006) makes a short survey of quantile regressions where she concludes “that 
controlling for sample selection bias does not have any major effect on public sector wage premiums.”   
Another solution to the selection issue are PSM techniques which basically consist in finding 
individuals that match in both sectors according to control variables, who then constitute the non-
biased sample used for directly measuring the premium along the new distribution. However, here 
raises a trade-off between having a large number of covariates which is desirable for controlling 
observables at best, and decreasing the number of individuals that fall within a common support 
region. The PSM then has two drawbacks: either the distributions obtained after PSM will contain too 
few individuals (especially in the public sector), or as a number of controls must be left out, the 
sample will actually continue bearing heterogeneities, or both. Unsurprisingly, the results we obtained 
from various PSM estimations leave us with an insufficient number of matching individuals (results 
available upon request).  
Given these considerations we pursued our analysis leaving the issue aside, preserving initial 
distributions. Thus, we account for differences in characteristics through estimation techniques that 
decompose the total wage gap into observable and unobservable components, such as the Oaxaca-
Blinder (O-B), Melly and JMP decompositions, and seek at minimizing selection by considering men 
and women separately, using a large number of control variables and omitting certain observations. 
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4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We use the HLFSs in 2005 and 2011,which benefit from a number of improvements recently brought 
by Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat): the HLFSs have been revised by the 2008 population 
projections;6 since 2013 age is provided as a continuous variable (previously discrete) and sectoral 
classification of economic activity has been harmonized which allows us constructing a coherent 
sectoral breakdown, a valuable control variable given the substantial transformation in the sectoral 
composition of public employment.7 
We restrict our sample by trimming 1% at both ends of the distribution to drop outliers, considering 
formal wage-earners (self-employed and unpaid family workers whose earnings are unreported are 
omitted) and population aged 21 years and above to minimize selection bias at earlier ages (e.g. 
Depalo et al., 2013; Dustmann and Van Soest, 1998): individuals not having completed university 
degree may not have the option to enter the public sector, notably if the public recruitment policies 
require tertiary diploma, which is the case for a large number of public jobs now in Turkey. The 
employer criterion (public/private) is used for the definition of employment. Where this information is 
not available, the default strategy may be inferring information from the sectoral classification of 
economic activities where public employment is typically defined as an individual working in the 
“Public administration and defence; compulsory social security” sector (category O in the NACE 
classification). This in turn bears a caveat in that the nature of sectoral activity, alongside other 
characteristics, may affect productivity (wage) differentials. The number of observations for men is 
37904 and 51165, and for women 9220 and 15024, respectively for the years 2005 and 2011. Our 
dependent variable is log real hourly wages computed as the declared monthly wage divided by 
regular hours worked multiplied by 4.3.  
                                                           
6
 TurkStat established an Address Based Population Registration System (ABPRS) in 2007, 2009 onwards 
HLFSs have been revised by the 2008 based population projection. 
7
 Classification of sectors of economic activity (NACE) has undergone a number of breaks throughout the 
period, such that the classifications were not compatible. Recently released microdata by TurkStat have been 
revised to harmonize sectoral classification (NACE rev.2). 
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The Kernel densities (Figure 2) reveal an increase in real hourly wages, in both sectors for both 
genders. The visual inspection suggests that public sector wages are more compressed in the public 
sector for both genders in accordance with the fair employer hypothesis. Distributions are more 
compressed for women than men, and the raw gap is a little larger for women. Although public wages 
are roughly the same in the public sector for both genders, real wages in the private sector for women 
are lower. More, the increase in private sector wages from 2005 to 2011 is less for women than men.  
Figure 2 
 
Table 1 
 
Table 1 gives nationally representative figures of employment according to the public and private 
(formal and informal sectors) for all wage earners. This is the first study that gives public employment 
figures in Turkey, as HLFS samples are the only representative samples in terms labour market 
indicators. Overall the share of public employment in total wage employment (including informal 
employment) has decreased from 24.8% in 2005 to 19.7% in 2011, from 35.9 to 25.3% in total formal 
wage employment. The decrease (increase) in the share of public (private) employment has been faster 
prior to the 2008 crisis. More, the share of university graduates has increased within the sectors, 
mostly in the public sector: from 42.7 to 63.1% (14.4 to 18.3% in the formal private sector and 3.1 to 
4% in the informal private sector).  
The population statistics (Table 2) provides the full list of control variables8. The share of women is 
higher in the public sector; in relative terms, it has increased in all sectors mostly in the public (from 
22.3 to 27.8) and informal sectors (from 20.1 to 23.7%), and least in the formal private sector (from 
18.6 to 20.9%). Tenure is substantially higher in the public sector and has increased from 2005 to 2011 
but decreased in both the formal and informal private sector. Working hours are lowest in public 
sector, and has decreased for all three sectors from 2005 to 2011, and the decrease has been least in the 
                                                           
8
 The aggregation tables of occupation and economic activity classifications are given in Annex 1and 2. 
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formal private sector. The educational level is highest in the public sector followed by the formal, then 
informal private sectors; and has increased in all three sectors from 2005 to 2011 reflecting the overall 
increase in the educational level of the economy. An interesting evolution has been the significant 
upgrading in the public where post-secondary educational level employees’ share has increased from 
42 to 62.7%. The bulk of the employees in the formal and informal private sectors have an educational 
level of primary and less than primary (respectively 49.3 and 66.2%) despite a decreasing trend (these 
findings are in conformity with the total sample values mentioned above). 
In terms of occupation the public sector is characterized by a high share of skilled employees. From 
2005 to 2011 there is a large decrease in the share of low-skilled occupations, especially elementary 
occupations, and an increase in high-skilled occupations, namely professionals (6 percentage points). 
Substantial change can also be observed in terms of sector of economic activity: public sector 
employees are mainly in the public administration, defence, education, human health and social work 
activities. Their share in the public sector has increased by more than 10 percentage points supporting 
the general rationalization process which has also entailed greater specialization in public services at 
the detriment of low-skilled activities that have been subjected to outsourcing. The bulk of 
employment in the private sector remains in the manufacturing (decreasing of ten percentage points in 
the formal sector) and wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and food 
service activities. 
 
Table 2 
 
5. DECOMPOSITION RESULTS  
The Oaxaca-Blinder and quantile decompositions for the public-private wage differentials are given in 
Table 3. The mean raw gap and premia are positive and high, and have slightly increased from 2005 to 
2011 for both genders (women’s premium increase has been highest). The premia at the mean for men 
and women are respectively 0.30 and 0.19 in 2005, and 0.37 and 0.31 in 2011. A number of reasons 
discussed above explain the positive premia at the mean such as wage setting procedures (central 
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government wage bargaining and existence of minimum wage9 vs. weak union power in the private 
sector10), higher tenure (stability, job protection and higher returns to tenure11), shorter working hours 
(vs. long and underpaid or unpaid working hours in the private sector12), and labour market slack 
despite various allowances and side benefits (OECD, 2008) that would be expected to have a 
decreasing effect on the premium.  
Table 3 
Observed characteristics explain more than half of the total mean wage gap: 54 and 57 percent for men 
in 2005 and 2011 respectively; for women these values are higher although declining: 73 and 65 
percent. Symmetrically, both the public wage premium and its contribution to the total gap have 
increased, more for women. The differences between genders may stem from both individual 
preferences of women for working in the public sector and greater discrimination against women in 
the private sector, assuming that the public sector has an equal pay policy.  
The quantile regressions allow assessing the gap and decomposing it along the wage distribution. The 
raw wage differentials are positive throughout the distribution for both men and women; both in 2005 
and 2011. The price effect dominates the composition effect at the lower end of the distribution, with a 
penalty at the end of the distribution. For men the composition effect exceeds the price effect after the 
50th (40th) percentile in 2005 (2011), for women after the 30th percentile in both years.  
We also estimate the decomposition using JMP’s methodology: the mean values are very similar with 
O-B decomposition, however values along the distribution does not provide expected results, as it does 
not capture heteroscedasticity as suggested by Melly: “The reason of the differences between our 
results and those commonly accepted in the literature is that quantile regression accounts for 
                                                           
9Comparing Turkey and the US Koçer and Visser (2009) show that weak social policies or collective bargaining 
mechanisms are likely to be compensated by minimum wage legislation as in the case of Turkey.  
10
 See Duman (2014) for a recent comprehensive account on the weakness of collective bargaining institutions in 
Turkey.  
11
 Returns to tenure in the public sector are higher and follow an unconditional compensation scheme regardless 
of position switch.  
12
 On the prevalence of long working hours in Turkey see Toksöz (2008). 
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heteroscedasticity while others, like the JMP decomposition, assume independent error terms. 
However, the variance of the residuals expands as a function of education and experience and is 
smaller within unionized workers or certain sectors (public administration, manufacturing). The fact 
that the population is getting more educated, less unionized and that employment in sectors with low 
variance declines puts more weight on groups with higher within-group inequality. This is a 
composition effect and not an increase in the price of unmeasured skills as concluded traditionally.” 
(Melly, 2005, p. 579). Indeed, the JMP decomposition results suggest that the difference between the 
price and composition effects along the wage distribution is substantially less than those obtained with 
the quantile decomposition. The price effect is overestimated (except for the first percentile) and 
increasingly so along the distribution, i.e., we observe a stable rather than an increasing gap between 
the composition and the price effect.  
The inter-percentile variation of the price effect confirms a decrease in the second half of the 
distribution line with a penalty at the higher end of the distribution. The level of premia is increasing 
along the wage distribution, more in the first half (50th – 10th percentile) of the distribution compared 
to the second (90th – 50th percentile). In terms of the contribution of the price effect we find a decrease 
along the distribution with decreasing returns (faster after the median) for men (2005 and 2011) and 
women for the year 2011 only (Table 3).  
Evolution of the gap 
Between 2005 and 2011 the premium has increased all along the distribution with varying magnitudes: 
for men it has increased more in the first half of the distribution, whereas for women it has increased 
more in the second half of the distribution. More strikingly, contributions of premia increase for both 
genders (mostly for women as expected given the higher increase in the level) which has resulted in a 
decrease of the contribution of the penalty for the higher percentiles; and/or an increase in the 
contribution of the premium at the higher end of the distribution (Table 4, Figure 3). A similar 
evolution is observed in Chile and Uruguay in Mizala et al. (2011) who attribute this evolution to 
public policy: “[t]his could be explained by the implementation of a human resources management 
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reform, aiming to attract and retain highly-skilled workers in the public sector”. However, as discussed 
earlier, such a finding may as well be the result of private sector wage dynamics.  
 
Table 4 
Figure 3 
 
Public policy or market dynamics? 
To disentangle the issue, we consider the wage gaps within sectors, public and private separately, 
between the years 2005 and 2011. We investigate whether the increase in the contribution of the price 
effect at the right end of the distribution is the result of a public or private wage policy. In the first 
case, one would expect a higher increase of the price effect favouring skilled employees in the public 
sector. In the latter case the pay gap should be the outcome of a lower increase of the price effect for 
high wage earners in the private sector. 
The bottom panel of Table 4 (Panel B) gives the Melly decomposition results within the public and 
private sector separately for both and women. Overall wages have increased in both sectors for all 
deciles. Increases in premia are higher and relatively more equal along the distribution in the public 
sector in conformity with the argument of an egalitarian wage indexation policy, compared to the 
private sector where the premium is decreasing.  
Consequently, comparing the two years, we yield two contrasted explanations for the evolution of the 
public-private wage gap as we observe two different wage policies within each sector at each end of 
the distribution. The widening public-private wage gap at lower deciles is a result of public wage 
policy after controlling for the composition effect. However moving towards the right end of the 
distribution as the wage increase is more unequal in the private sector. This implies that the increase in 
the public-private premium, and the decrease in the penalty, at the higher end of the distribution are 
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largely due to a relatively lower increase of the price effect in the private sector. In contrast, the price 
effect is not significantly different across the distribution in the public sector.  
The fact that price effects are higher at the lower end of the distribution in both sectors may be 
attributed to the institutional wage setting, notably the existence of a minimum wage which also serves 
as a reference pay for private sector low wage earners. More, low-skilled men have benefitted from a 
higher increase in the price effect in the public sector relatively to the private sector. This may be due 
to the centralized collective wage bargaining, a greater job protection and the opportunities of tenure-
related wage increases in the public sector. Unexpectedly, the prevalence of informal employment, 
especially among low-skilled workers, does not seem to dampen wage increase at the lower end of the 
distribution in the private sector. This corroborates the argument that the minimum wage is also a 
reference pay for the informal sector. 
Figure 4 
 
Turning to the contribution of the price effect within each sector (Figure 4), the picture becomes 
clearer: it is fairly stable along the distribution until the 70th percentile, higher in the private sector. A 
striking break occurs at the 80th percentile where the contribution of the price effect decreases in the 
private sector, and gets below the contribution of the public sector; the decrease is much more 
substantial for women. These imply that the increase in the contribution of premia at the higher deciles 
observed above has been the result of a decrease in the contribution of the price effect in the private 
sector against a relatively more even increase in the contribution of the price effect along the 
distribution in the public sector. As the decrease has been significantly more for women, the impact on 
women’s premia at the higher deciles has been higher. To sum up, notwithstanding differences in the 
respective distributions, 13 there has been a greater discrimination in the private sector in higher 
deciles, more against women than for men. Hence, the penalty in working in the public sector has 
                                                           
13
 Differences in distributions (public vs. private sectors and these vs. the distributions of the public-private wage 
gap) explain why the percentiles where the contribution of the price effect to total public-private wage gaps 
increase do not match exactly with the percentiles at which the contribution of the price effect in the private 
sector gets below that of the public sector.  
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decreased for women and led to a convergence of their premia with men’s premia at the higher end of 
the distribution. This finding is incompatible with the long-term trend identified by Borjas (2002) in 
the US labour market. He finds that over the long run (1960-2000) men’s premium is stable, whereas 
women’s premium is decreasing with initially very high values where: “[t]his decline in the pay 
advantage of women employed in the public sector partly reflects the significant improvement in 
economic opportunities that private sector female workers experienced over the past few decades.” 
This may be the outcome of either an unequal pay for equal job, for which the policy implication 
would be the implementation and enforcement of measures aiming at applying equal pay for equal 
jobs; or a glass ceiling effect, which would necessitate policies facilitating women’s access to 
positions of responsibility. 
Last, but not least, demand and supply dynamics certainly affected the variation of the wage structure 
within the private sector. The literature reveals a decrease of the overall wage inequality in Turkey 
(Bakış and Polat, 2014) as in Latin America (Gasparini and Lustig, 2011; Lustig et al., 2013) during 
the 2000s. This is consistent with our findings which suggest that, controlling for composition, the 
price effect has increased more rapidly for low wage earners compared to high wage earners. Although 
we do not test directly for the determinants, the evidence suggests that in Turkey, alongside the wage 
increase in low-skilled jobs (which together with the minimum wage explain part of the premium for 
low-wage workers, Bakış and Polat, 2014), the demand for high-skilled workers did not keep pace 
with the expansion of supply in higher education in the private sector. The story for high skilled 
workers can be analyzed in Tinbergen’s framework of race between technology and education 
(Acemoğlu, 2002). However, in Turkey, it seems that the expansion of tertiary education has been 
greater than technological change –if any. This is in line with the fact that the composition effect is 
higher and the price effect lowest at the right end of the distribution in the private sector.  
While these arguments account for quantities, another feature that has been brought to light by Card 
and Krueger (1990) and only recently been debated in the case of less advanced economies is the 
quality of education. The increase in educated workforce may have caused a signalling issue on the 
market for educated employees due to increased heterogeneity in diploma quality. Bakış et al. (2013) 
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show that in Turkey this may also have been the case as the variance of returns has increased in the 
second half of the 2000s within higher educated workers, notwithstanding an increase in their real 
hourly wages (raw). The degradation in education quality, especially in higher education, works 
complementarily with Tinbergen’s race, amplifying the quantitative supply effect of education. 
The conclusion is that public-private wage differentials may increasingly be the outcome of private 
sector wage dynamics rather than public wage policy per se, especially at the higher end of the 
distribution. While the contrasted evolution of the price effect along the distribution within the private 
sector is decreasing wage inequality, it may be contributing to the increase (decrease) in the premium 
(penalty) of public wages for the educated workforce.  
6. CONCLUSION 
The total public-private wage gap in Turkey is positive both at the mean and along the wage 
distribution. Although the composition effect dominates at the mean, the price effect is decreasing 
along the distribution with a penalty at the higher end. Employees at the lower (higher) end benefit 
(suffer) from higher public wage premia (penalty). Comparing the evolution between 2005 and 2011, 
the raw gap has increased without much change along the distribution. However, we find that the 
contribution of the price effect to the raw gap has increased at the right end and that the penalty 
decreased although it did not disappear.  
The question than is whether this evolution has been the outcome of a public or private wage policy. 
This is an important issue for other emerging countries where the enhancement of government 
effectiveness needs to be addressed together with private sector dynamics. Considering wage 
differentials within the sectors, our results suggest that this has rather been the outcome of a lower 
price effect in the higher percentiles in the private sector contrasted with a more equal pattern in terms 
of price effect along the public wage distribution.14 Consequently, upgrading in public employment 
has been consistent with a sound fiscal management both quantitatively (decreased share of public 
                                                           
14
 More, private sector wage dynamics may also have contributed to the improvement of income distribution and 
relative poverty (in monetary terms) alongside public policy.  
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employment) and qualitatively (enhancement of government effectiveness). It has also been a less 
costly wage policy without having to increase the premium for high-skilled workers since the price 
effect remains relatively low in the private sector. 
Differences between the two sectors are assessed as the result of contrasted wage setting mechanisms 
due to factors stemming from both institutional and, supply and demand factors. Turkey’s public 
employment policy is highly centralized and the wage adjustments are subject to collective bargaining; 
as a result of which wage increases are more stable (equal) along the distribution validating the “fair 
employer” hypothesis.15 On the other hand, unionization and unions’ power in the private sector are 
very weak and practically inexistent for high-skilled workers, as elsewhere.16 In terms of demand and 
supply dynamics within the private sector, increased supply in higher educated workforce, with 
possibly lower quality, are factors that may also explain the slower increase of the price effect at the 
higher end of the distribution relatively to the lower end. 
Increased premium, or decreased penalty, in working in the public sector for high-skill employees 
presents a trade-off between enhanced productivity in the public sector and decreased ability of the 
private sector to compete and attract productive workforce. However, as this trend is an outcome of a 
lower wage increase in the private sector, ultimately the future outcome will depend on the private 
sector wage policy -insofar as the public sector does not alter its wage and fiscal policy-, and demand 
and supply dynamics on the labour market.  
                                                           
15
 Comparing premia in France, Italy and Great Britain, Ghinetti and Lucifora (2013) highlight that in a context 
of centralized wage setting as observed in France, this is an expected outcome. 
16
 Unfortunately the HLFS questionnaires do not ask for union membership. Even then, it is doubtful whether 
these would control for what they are meant to. Typically, although there is some evidence that public employees 
are more unionized than their private counterparts they do not have the right to strike; and “collective 
bargaining” in the public sector is an institution that originates from a historically centralized public wage policy 
that is not much correlated with the existence of unions, or rate of unionization.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES: 
 
Figure 1 Evolution of governance indicators in Turkey (1996-2012) 
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2012 
 
Figure 2 Public and Private Sector Wage Distributions (Kernel densities) 
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Table 1 Evolution of employment by sector (wage earners only, age 15 and above) 
 Years Total weighted Share In total employment (%) Share within total employment of 
each sector (%) 
  
Public 
formal 
Private 
formal 
Private 
informal Total 
Public 
formal 
Private 
formal 
Private 
informal Total 
Public 
formal 
Private 
formal 
Private 
informal Total 
  Total Total   
  
  
2005   2.690.560    4.810.564    3.339.665     10.840.789  25 44 31 100   
  
  
2006   2.646.136    5.300.274    3.353.564     11.299.974  23 47 30 100   
  
  
2007   2.572.229    5.932.813    3.201.868     11.706.910  22 51 27 100   
  
  
2008   2.509.712    6.635.122    2.891.594     12.036.428  21 55 24 100   
  
  
2009   2.444.717    6.535.899    2.696.825     11.677.441  21 56 23 100   
  
  
2010   2.519.781    7.169.713    2.819.695     12.509.189  20 57 23 100   
  
  
2011   2.658.246    7.855.508    2.996.327     13.510.081  20 58 22 100   
  
  
   Post secondary  Post secondary Post secondary 
2005   1.148.612  694.8 102.498      1.945.910  59 36 5 100 43 14 3 18 
2006   1.233.862  813.909 106.088      2.153.859  57 38 5 100 47 15 3 19 
2007   1.274.219  934.939 112.889      2.322.047  55 40 5 100 50 16 4 20 
2008   1.325.243    1.106.077  109.173      2.540.493  52 44 4 100 53 17 4 21 
2009   1.392.469    1.159.464  105.676      2.657.609  52 44 4 100 57 18 4 23 
2010   1.530.272    1.233.815  107.822      2.871.909  53 43 4 100 61 17 4 23 
2011   1.676.537    1.434.122  120.067      3.230.726  52 44 4 100 63 18 4 24 
   Secondary  Secondary Secondary 
2005 872.194   1.518.643  540.372      2.931.209  30 52 18 100 32 32 16 27 
2006 808.279   1.706.312  571.108      3.085.699  26 55 19 100 31 32 17 27 
2007 751.206   1.922.945  553.343      3.227.494  23 60 17 100 29 32 17 28 
2008 680.658   2.135.790  483.205      3.299.653  21 65 15 100 27 32 17 27 
2009 608.004   2.054.313  460.206      3.122.523  20 66 15 100 25 31 17 27 
2010 576.971   2.169.706  444.193      3.190.870  18 68 14 100 23 30 16 26 
2011 583.444   2.346.471  451.852      3.381.767  17 69 13 100 22 30 15 25 
Authors’ calculations from various HLFSs 
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Table 2 Population statistics 
 
 
2005 2011 
Sample Omitted Total Sample Omitted Total 
Public Private formal Informal Public Private Formal Informal 
 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Gender (woman)  22.3% 18.6% 20.1% 20.0% 27.8% 20.9% 23.7% 22.9% 
Urban 80.5% 88.4% 78.9% 83.7% 79.9% 85.9% 71.5% 81.9% 
Tenure 12.5 5.4 5.5 7.4 12.9 4.7 2.9 6.1 
Tenure2 2.2 0.6 0.8 1.1 2.5 0.5 0.4 0.9 
Age 38.0 32.5 34.9 34.6 38.9 33.7 36.6 35.3 
Age2 15.1 11.2 13.2 12.8 15.9 12.0 14.6 13.3 
Actual Working hours 43.4 54.8 56.6 52.2 41.3 53.5 53.9 51.1 
Number of household members 3.9 4.0 4.7 4.2 3.6 4.0 4.8 4.1 
No schooling 0.7% 1.4% 9.6% 3.4% 0.3% 2.2% 12.9% 3.8% 
Primary and less than primary 24.5% 53.3% 71.8% 50.4% 14.7% 49.3% 66.2% 45.3% 
High school 18.3% 16.0% 8.7% 14.6% 11.0% 14.8% 9.1% 12.9% 
Vocational high school 14.5% 15.2% 6.4% 12.6% 11.3% 15.4% 6.9% 12.9% 
Post-secondary 42.0% 14.2% 3.6% 18.8% 62.7% 18.2% 4.8% 25.0% 
Never married 12.3% 27.4% 24.7% 22.6% 15.4% 27.6% 24.8% 24.6% 
Married 86.0% 71.0% 72.0% 75.3% 81.8% 69.6% 70.8% 72.4% 
Divorced 1.2% 1.3% 2.0% 1.5% 2.2% 2.4% 3.2% 2.5% 
Spouse died 0.5% 0.4% 1.3% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 1.2% 0.6% 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.9% 0.6% 9.4% 3.0% 0.8% 0.9% 11.0% 2.8% 
Mining and quarrying and other industry 4.2% 1.4% 0.5% 1.9% 2.7% 2.1% 0.7% 1.9% 
Manufacturing 3.7% 44.8% 23.6% 28.0% 1.6% 35.6% 20.5% 25.7% 
Construction 1.3% 5.1% 17.5% 7.4% 0.4% 7.9% 16.9% 8.0% 
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and 
storage, accommodation and food service 
activities 
5.2% 30.7% 32.1% 24.1% 3.0% 29.6% 29.9% 24.1% 
Information and communication + Financial and 
insurance activities + Real estate activities 
4.3% 4.3% 1.0% 3.4% 1.7% 5.3% 2.4% 4.0% 
Professional, scientific, technical, administration 
and support service activities 
1.9% 5.8% 2.8% 3.9% 0.3% 11.5% 3.3% 7.6% 
Public administration, defence, education, human 
health and social work activities 
75.9% 3.9% 3.4% 23.2% 86.6% 4.6% 6.6% 22.1% 
Other services 2.8% 3.5% 9.8% 5.0% 3.0% 2.4% 8.8% 3.8% 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 6.0% 4.3% 2.4% 4.2% 7.9% 4.4% 2.3% 4.8% 
Professionals 29.3% 5.3% 1.5% 10.8% 35.2% 4.9% 1.2% 10.5% 
Technicians and associate professionals 14.4% 10.5% 3.5% 9.7% 13.5% 10.0% 3.3% 9.5% 
Clerks 14.3% 11.4% 4.0% 10.2% 16.6% 12.3% 4.0% 11.6% 
Service workers and shop and market sales 
workers 12.0% 13.7% 17.7% 14.3% 11.7% 15.9% 22.7% 16.3% 
Skill agricultural and fishery workers + Craft and 
related workers + Plant and machine operators 
and assemblers  
14.0% 42.5% 44.9% 35.4% 8.6% 36.9% 37.8% 31.2% 
Elementary occupations 10.0% 12.2% 26.1% 15.4% 6.5% 15.7% 28.5% 16.2% 
Note.- The table includes all covariates except regions. 
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Table 3 Summary results – Oaxaca-Blinder, Melly and JMP decompositions for public-private 
wage differentials 
  2005 2011 2005 2011 2005 2011 2005 2011 
  MELLY MEN MELLY WOMEN JMP MEN JMP WOMEN 
  
      
  
Total 0.648 0.864 0.686 0.878 0.649 0.864 0.685 0.878 
Composition 0.349 0.492 0.5 0.571 0.320 0.472 0.402 0.523 
Price 0.299 0.371 0.187 0.307 0.329 0.391 0.283 0.355 
10th percentile   
      
  
Total 0.588 0.836 0.675 0.836 0.588 0.847 0.685 0.878 
Composition 0.182 0.223 0.288 0.390 0.222 0.416 0.402 0.523 
Price 0.405 0.613 0.387 0.446 0.345 0.415 0.283 0.355 
50th percentile   
      
  
Total 0.794 0.969 0.852 1.050 0.775 0.971 0.848 1.048 
Composition 0.511 0.592 0.746 0.799 0.389 0.540 0.506 0.640 
Price 0.283 0.377 0.105 0.251 0.356 0.414 0.328 0.385 
90th percentile   
      
  
Total 0.457 0.668 0.46 0.560 0.487 0.668 0.468 0.573 
Composition 0.627 0.783 0.580 0.629 0.260 0.381 0.303 0.345 
Price -0.170 -0.115 -0.12 -0.069 0.258 0.328 0.187 0.243 
    
      
  
Obs. 37904 51165 9220 15024 37904 51165 9220 15024 
    
      
  
Contribution of composition at the mean 54% 57% 73% 65% 49% 55% 59% 60% 
Contribution of the price (premium)   
      
  
10th percentile 69% 73% 57% 53% 59% 49% 41% 40% 
50th percentile 36% 39% 12% 24% 46% 43% 39% 37% 
90th percentile -37% -17% -25% -12% 53% 49% 40% 42% 
Differences in premia   
      
  
50-10 -0.122  -0.236  -0.282  -0.195  0.011  -0.002  0.046  0.030  
90-50 -0.453  -0.492  -0.223  -0.320  -0.098  -0.086  -0.142  -0.142  
Differences in contributions of premia   
      
  
50-10 -0.333 -0.344 -0.450 -0.294 -0.128 -0.064 -0.025 -0.037 
90-50 -0.729 -0.561 -0.379 -0.363 0.072 0.065 0.012 0.057 
Note.- Mean values in the Melly Quantile regression columns are Oaxaca-Blinder results.  
Table 4 Quantile decomposition results by percentiles 
PANEL A PUBLIC-PRIVATE WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
  Men 2005 Men 2011 Women 2005 Women 2011 
  Total Composition Price Price/total Total Composition Price Price/total Total Composition Price Price/total Total Composition Price Price/total 
p10 0.588 0.182 0.405 69% 0.836 0.223 0.613 73% 0.675 0.288 0.387 57% 0.836 0.390 0.446 53% 
p20 0.744 0.192 0.552 74% 0.956 0.262 0.693 73% 0.762 0.357 0.405 53% 0.987 0.470 0.517 52% 
p30 0.754 0.239 0.515 68% 1.019 0.325 0.693 68% 0.875 0.539 0.336 38% 1.019 0.613 0.405 40% 
p40 0.783 0.357 0.426 54% 1.009 0.500 0.509 50% 0.852 0.629 0.223 26% 1.049 0.731 0.318 30% 
p50 0.794 0.511 0.283 36% 0.969 0.592 0.377 39% 0.852 0.746 0.105 12% 1.050 0.799 0.251 24% 
p60 0.754 0.575 0.178 24% 0.990 0.730 0.260 26% 0.822 0.829 -0.007 -1% 1.037 0.814 0.223 22% 
p70 0.720 0.589 0.131 18% 0.900 0.693 0.207 23% 0.693 0.693 0.000 0% 0.924 0.875 0.049 5% 
p80 0.619 0.580 0.039 6% 0.833 0.693 0.140 17% 0.636 0.756 -0.120 -19% 0.811 0.724 0.087 11% 
p90 0.457 0.627 -0.170 -37% 0.668 0.783 -0.115 -17% 0.462 0.580 -0.118 -25% 0.560 0.629 -0.069 -12% 
 PANEL B WITHIN SECTOR WAGE DIFFERENTIALS (2005-2011) 
  Public men   Private men   Public women   Private women   
  Total Composition Price Price/total Total Composition Price Price/total Total Composition Price Price/total Total Composition Price Price/total 
p10 0.436 0.223 0.213 49% 0.187 0.028 0.159 85% 0.300 0.087 0.21 71% 0.139 0.000 0.139 100% 
p20 0.387 0.095 0.293 76% 0.176 0.000 0.176 100% 0.324 0.049 0.28 85% 0.099 0.000 0.099 100% 
p30 0.403 0.073 0.330 82% 0.139 0.000 0.139 100% 0.282 0.028 0.25 90% 0.139 0.000 0.139 100% 
p40 0.346 0.069 0.277 80% 0.120 -0.028 0.148 123% 0.308 0.065 0.24 79% 0.110 0.000 0.110 100% 
p50 0.336 0.034 0.302 90% 0.160 0.000 0.160 100% 0.290 0.046 0.24 84% 0.092 -0.016 0.107 117% 
p60 0.335 0.057 0.278 83% 0.099 0.000 0.099 100% 0.307 0.043 0.26 86% 0.092 0.000 0.092 100% 
p70 0.289 0.051 0.237 82% 0.109 0.000 0.109 100% 0.261 0.030 0.23 89% 0.030 0.000 0.030 100% 
p80 0.313 0.056 0.257 82% 0.099 0.041 0.058 59% 0.270 0.046 0.22 83% 0.095 0.101 -0.006 -6% 
p90 0.255 0.016 0.239 94% 0.041 0.010 0.030 74% 0.261 0.049 0.21 81% 0.172 0.087 0.085 49% 
 
Note.-The Melly decomposition using probit link is estimated includes covariates in table 2. Omitted categories are: no schooling for education, never married for marital status, agriculture, forestry and fishing for sectoral activity, and 
legislators, senior officials and managers for occupational classification.
 Figure 3 Contributions of the price effects to public-private total wage differential 
 
Derived from Table 4 
 
Figure 4 Contributions of the price effects to wage differentials within sectors from 2005 to 2011 
 
Derived from Table 4 
Annex 1 Broader groupings- ISCO88 and NACE rev2 to ISIC (9 to 7) 
ISCO88 Skill level Aggregation 
1. Legislators, senior officials and managers - 1 
2. Professionals 4 2 
3. Technicians and associate professionals 3 3 
4. Clerks 2 4 
5. Service workers and shop and market sales workers 2 5 
6. Skill agricultural and fishery workers 2  
7. Craft and related workers 2 6 
8. Plant and machine operators and assemblers 2  
9. Elementary occupations 1 7 
Note.- Group 6, 7 and 8 have been aggregated to make up for one group because number of observations were insufficient in either the public sector. 
 
Annex 2 High level aggregation of ISIC rev4 (21 to 9 sectors) 
NACE Rev. 2 High-level aggregation ISIC rev.4/ NACE rev.2 Our 
aggregation 
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1 A Agriculture, forestry and fishing isic1 
B Mining and quarrying 
2 B, C, D and E Manufacturing, mining and quarrying and other industry isic2* C Manufacturing 
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
E Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 
C Manufacturing 2a C Of which: manufacturing isic3 
F Construction  3 F Construction isic4 
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
4 G, H and I Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and food service 
activities isic5 H Transportation and storage 
I Accommodation and food service activities 
J Information and communication 5 J Information and communication  
isic6 K Financial and insurance activities 6 K Financial and insurance activities  
L Real estate activities 7 L Real estate activities 
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 8 M and N Professional, scientific, technical, administration and support service activities isic7 
N Administrative and support service activities 
O Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
9 O, P and Q Public administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities isic8 P Education 
Q Human health and social work activities 
R Arts, entertainment and recreation  
10 R, S, T and U Other services isic9 
S Other service activities 
T Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of 
households for own use 
U Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies 
* Manufacturing excluded 
High level aggregation according to ““high-level SNA/ISIC aggregation A*10/11” in Eurostat (2008) “NACE Rev.2. Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community”, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-RA-07-015/EN/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF and http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/docs/i4_SNA.pdf 
Sectors 5, 6, and 7 have been aggregated to make up for one group because number of observations was insufficient in the public sector 
